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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 1:45 am
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Results for complaints against the police
7 results foundAuthor: Canada. Commission for Public Complaints Against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Title: RCMP Use of the Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW): Final Report, Including Recommendations for Immediate Implementation Summary: The increasing reliance by the RCMP upon the conducted energy weapon has generated significant expressions of public concern. This report presents a systematic review of RCMP policies and practices following its adoption of the conducted energy weapon. Details: Ottawa: Commission for Public Complaints Against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2008. 78p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2008 Country: Canada URL: Shelf Number: 115540 Keywords: Complaints Against the PolicePolice Use of ForceStun GunsTasers |
Author: Wisler, Dominique Title: Police Governance: European Union Best Practices Summary: This publication focuses on best practice within the European Union in the areas of: community policing, auditing internally the police, assessing performance, complaint mechanism against the police, and independent control authority in data protection. Details: Geneva, Switzerland: DCAF - Democratic Control of Armed Forces, COGNITA, 2011. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on February 3, 2012 at http://www.dcaf.ch/content/download/55498/838039/file/ProconEU_Best_Practices_PoliceGovernance.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: http://www.dcaf.ch/content/download/55498/838039/file/ProconEU_Best_Practices_PoliceGovernance.pdf Shelf Number: 123932 Keywords: Community Policing (Europe)Complaints Against the PolicePolice Performance |
Author: Roth, Lenny Title: External oversight of police conduct Summary: The importance of having a system of external oversight of police conduct was highlighted by the Wood Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service in the mid-1990s. The external oversight model that has been in place in NSW since that time has involved two key agencies: the NSW Ombudsman, which primarily oversees the way in which NSW Police deals with complaints, and the Police Integrity Commission, which investigates serious police misconduct as well as overseeing the way in which other agencies investigate such misconduct. In recent times, the effectiveness of this system has been called into question. In February 2015, a Legislative Council Select Committee report referred to "dysfunction" within the system and recommended that a further committee inquiry be held on reforming the system, "with a view to establishing a single, well-resourced police oversight body". The NSW Government has since appointed former Shadow Attorney-General, Andrew Tink, to review the police oversight system, including examining options for a single civilian oversight model. The terms of reference for the review were released on 21 May and Mr Tink has been asked to report by 31 August 2015. This paper revisits the Wood Royal Commission report, examines the current system in NSW, and discusses the many reviews of the system that have taken place over the past decade. It also outlines the police oversight models in other Australian jurisdictions and in the United Kingdom. In summary: - The Commonwealth has a very similar model to NSW. South Australia also has a multi-agency model but it comprises a Police Ombudsman and the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (this system is also currently under review). - Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia have a single agency model, in the form of a general anti-corruption commission. - In England and Wales, there is a single agency, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, which was set up in 2004 and investigates serious complaints and critical incidents. Reports have expressed concern at the IPCC's lack of resources and the effectiveness of the complaints. Details: Sydney: NSW Parliamentary Research Service, 2015. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper No. 6/2015: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/74D5A9F61C454021CA257E5B001EF114/$File/External%20oversight%20of%20police%20conduct.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/74D5A9F61C454021CA257E5B001EF114/$File/External%20oversight%20of%20police%20conduct.pdf Shelf Number: 136016 Keywords: Complaints Against the PolicePolice CorruptionPolice IntegrityPolice MisconductPolice Oversight |
Author: Marin, Andre Title: Oversight Unseen: Investigation into the Special Investigations Unit's operational effectiveness and credibility Summary: Canada received considerable unfavourable international attention last fall when millions witnessed the graphic video images of the last terrifying moments in the life of Robert Dziekanski. After a long and delayed international flight from his native Poland, Mr. Dziekanski arrived at Vancouver Airport, only to spend hours wandering hopelessly, unable to communicate or to obtain the assistance he needed to exit and meet up with his mother. As Mr. Dziekanski became increasingly confused and agitated, RCMP officers arrived and, within minutes, stunned him with a Taser. He was then restrained, and died shortly thereafter. In the aftermath of this tragedy, public accusations were made of cover-up and police using excessive force. People demanded assurance that the truth surrounding his ill-fated encounter with police would be revealed, and many voiced distrust of any investigation that would involve police investigating police. To Ontario's great credit, incidents in this province involving serious injury and death of civilians resulting from police contact are not investigated by police officials, but by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), a civilian criminal investigative agency. Created in 1990, the SIU's existence is a testament to the strength of democratic principles in this province, and the value our government has placed on reinforcing public confidence in policing. Unfortunately, over the past two years, several serious concerns have been raised by individuals, families, lawyers and community advocates who complained to my Office about the credibility and effectiveness of the SIU. As previous independent reviews have documented, the SIU's early history was marked by successive governments failing to provide it with adequate resources, and by police officials aggressively resisting its oversight. While its resources have increased over time, and regulatory requirements now more clearly define police obligations, my investigation found that the Special Investigations Unit continues to struggle to assert its authority, maintain its balance against powerful police interests, and carry out its mandate effectively. The SIU is still very much a fledgling organization. It does not have its own constituting legislation, its mandate lacks clarity, it is administratively and technically challenged and it is dependent on the Ministry of the Attorney General. In turn, the Ministry of the Attorney General has relied on the SIU to soothe police and community sensibilities and to ward off controversy. But in doing so, it performance is subjectively evaluated and rewarded, compromising the SIU's structural integrity and independence. Its credibility as an independent investigative agency is further undermined by the predominant presence and continuing police links of former police officials within the SIU. It is so steeped in police culture that it has, at times, even tolerated the blatant display of police insignia and police affiliation. In addition to lacking the necessary statutory authority to act decisively when police officials fail to comply with regulatory requirements, the SIU often ignores the tools it does have, such as public censure, and adopts an impotent stance in the face of police challenge. Delays in police providing notice of incidents, in disclosing notes, and in submitting to interviews are endemic. Rather than vigorously inquiring into and documenting delays and other evidence of police resistance, the SIU deals with issues of police non-co-operation as isolated incidents. It ignores systemic implications and attempts to solve individual problems through a conciliatory approach. The SIU has not only become complacent about ensuring that police officials follow the rules, it has bought into the fallacious argument that SIU investigations aren't like other criminal cases, and that it is acceptable to treat police witnesses differently from civilians. Police interviews are rarely held within the regulatory time frames, and are all too often postponed - for weeks, sometimes even months. The SIU will not inconvenience officers or police forces by interviewing officers off duty. When it encounters overt resistance from police officials, the SIU pursues a low-key diplomatic approach that flies under the public radar. If disagreement cannot be resolved, the SIU more often than not simply accepts defeat. The SIU also fails to respond to incidents with rigour and urgency - at times inexplicably overlooking the closest investigators, and following routines that result in precious investigative minutes, sometimes hours, being lost. It has become mired in its own internal events, and introspective focus. The SIU's system of oversight is out of balance. It must not only ensure accountability of police conduct, but be perceived by the public as doing so. At present, the public is expected to trust that the SIU conducts thorough and objective investigations and accept that its decisions are well founded when it decides, for example, not to charge officers. But much remains hidden from public view, including Director's reports and significant policy issues. In order to properly serve the function it was created to fulfill, greater transparency is required with respect to the SIU's investigative outcomes, as well as those of the police disciplinary system triggered by SIU investigations. In theory, the SIU is a fundamental pillar of accountability in Ontario. However, the reality is that the SIU is capable of much more than it is achieving at present. It is incumbent on government to provide the agencies it creates with the means to fully accomplish their mandates. The citizens of Ontario are entitled to a Special Investigations Unit with the necessary resources and tools to be the best that it can be. With that in mind, I have made 46 recommendations in this report, addressed at improving the system. The first 25 recommendations focus on the SIU itself. I believe that there is much that the SIU can do on its own to enhance and inject more rigour into its investigative practices, and its response to challenges to its authority. I have also made recommendations to address the issues created by a lingering police culture within the SIU, and to achieve greater transparency. Details: Ottawa: Ombudsman Ontario, 2008. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/marin_report_2008.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Canada URL: http://www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/marin_report_2008.pdf Shelf Number: 136686 Keywords: Complaints Against the PoliceInvestigationsOmbudsmanPolice AccountabilityPolice BehaviorPolice MisconductPolice OversightPolice Use of Force |
Author: Katz, Charles M. Title: Phoenix, Arizona, Smart Policing Initiative: Evaluating the Impact of Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras Summary: A number of highly publicized deaths of citizens at the hands of the police have sparked a national debate over police accountability 0 with body-worn cameras (BWCs) at the center of the debate. BWCs enjoy support from many law enforcement agencies, citizen advocacy groups, civil rights organizations, politicians, and the federal government. Though there has been wide-ranging speculation over the potential impact and consequences of BWCs, few rigorous examinations of the technology have been conducted, and many questions remain unanswered. The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), through the Smart Policing Initiative (SPI), funded the Phoenix Police Department to purchase, deploy, and evaluate police body-worn cameras. In the study, the Phoenix SPI team deployed 56 BWCs to officers in one of the two Maryvale Precinct squad areas. All officers assigned to the target area were issued BWCs, and officers in the adjacent squad area served as a comparison group. Cameras were deployed in the field in April 2013, and the study period covered approximately 30 months (15 months pre-deployment; 15 months post-deployment). The evaluation of BWCs, led by the research partners at Arizona State University, focused on six critical areas: (1) officer camera activation compliance, (2) officer perceptions of the wearability and utility of body-worn cameras, (3) impact on officers' job performance, (4) impact on public compliance and cooperation, (5) impact on officer accountability, and (6) impact on domestic violence case processing and outcomes. The study found the following: (1) Officer compliance with the activation of BWCs was generally low (under 30 percent), varying by call type (between 6 percent and 48 percent). (2) Police perceptions of BWCs changed notably over time, as officers reported increased comfort and ease as well as greater recognition of the benefits of the technology. (3) BWCs appeared to increase arrest activity. (4) BWCs did not seem to change citizen behavior, based on resisting-arrest charges. (5) BWCs appeared to significantly reduce complaints against officers (23 percent drop) when compared with officers in the other squad area (10 percent increase). (6) Finally, BWCs improved the processing of domestic violence incidents, as cases with video were more likely to be charged and successfully prosecuted, although BWCs did result in longer case processing times. The Phoenix SPI study produced a number of important lessons learned. The decision to deploy BWCs represents an enormous investment in resources and manpower. It is important for police managers to be strategic, deliberate, and collaborative in planning their BWC program. Coordination with the Prosecutor's Office is absolutely critical. Training, policy development, and transparency with line officers also are essential for a successful BWC program. The perceived benefits of BWCs hinge on their use and proper operation in accordance with departmental policy. That is, the benefits of BWCs can be realized only if officers appropriately activate the cameras during police-citizen encounters. Line officers should become educated Line officers should become educated consumers regarding BWCs, and both line officers and police managers should be realistic about the potential impact of the technology on police operations, encounters with citizens, and community perceptions of police legitimacy. Details: Arlington, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2015. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2015 at: http://www.smartpolicinginitiative.com/sites/all/files/Phoenix%20SPI%20Spotlight%20FINAL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.smartpolicinginitiative.com/sites/all/files/Phoenix%20SPI%20Spotlight%20FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 136946 Keywords: Body-Worn CamerasComplaints Against the PolicePolice AccountabilityPolice LegitimacyPolice TechnologyPolice-Citizens Encounters |
Author: Morden, John W. Title: Independent Civilian Review into Matters Relating to the G20 Summit Summary: The Independent Civilian Review into Matters Relating to the G20 Summit was launched on September 23, 2010 by the Toronto Police Services Board. The Review examined issues concerning the role the Board played with respect to the policing of the G20 Summit that was held in Toronto on June 25-27, 2010. It also examined the role played by the Toronto Police Service during the G20 Summit, with a view to determining whether the plans developed and implemented were adequate and effective for policing of the Summit. The Board appointed the Honourable John W. Morden, a former Associate Chief Justice of Ontario, to conduct the Review and provide a report and recommendations. Details: Toronto: Toronto Police Services Board, 2012. 475p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 28, 2017 at: http://www.tpsb.ca/g20/ICRG20Mordenreport.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Canada URL: http://www.tpsb.ca/g20/ICRG20Mordenreport.pdf Shelf Number: 146909 Keywords: Civilian Oversight of PoliceComplaints Against the PolicePolice Accountability Police Oversight Police Policies and PracticesPolice ReformPublic DisorderRiots and Protests |
Author: Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Title: Audit of complaints investigated by Professional Standards Command, Victoria Police Summary: As part of our work to determine how effectively Victoria Police handles complaints against police officers, IBAC audited how PSC handled a sample of complaint files, consisting of 59 investigations out of the 221 investigations finalised by PSC in 2015/16. The 59 files selected for audit by IBAC covered complaint investigations that concerned more serious allegations made about Victoria Police officers. These matters included allegations of assault, improper criminal associations, drug use or possession offences, sexual offences, handling stolen goods, threats to kill, interference in investigations, and misuse of information. The audit identified a number of concerns regarding PSC's complaint handling that require improvement. Practices that require improvement include: Poor management of conflicts of interest: The vast majority of files audited (95 per cent) did not explicitly identify or address actual, perceived or potential conflicts of interest between investigators and subject officers. Failure to consistently consult with the Office of Public Prosecutions: Victoria Police did not consistently consult with the Office of Public Prosecutions in relation to reportable offences as required under section 127(2) of the Victoria Police Act 2013. Inadequate recommended actions: IBAC auditors disagreed with the action Victoria Police recommended in 15 per cent of files. This included two matters where it appeared the Assistant Commissioner of PSC downgraded the recommended disciplinary action without providing clear reasons. Probity concerns: The audit identified some PSC investigators had complaint histories that raised issues of concern and could adversely affect community confidence in the outcome of investigations. Inappropriate file classification: The way complaint files are classified by PSC determines how they are managed. Issues were identified with the way the work file classification (known as a C1-0 file) is used. The audit found the approach adopted by PSC means this classification is being used well beyond its stated purpose of undertaking preliminary inquiries. For example, the work file classification was used for complaints that contained clear allegations of criminality off-duty (C3-3 file) or corruption (C3-4 file). The practice of reclassifying a matter as a work file after an investigation had been completed, on the basis that the file contained 'intelligence only', was also considered inappropriate. One of the risks in allowing files to be reclassified as work files on closure is that complaint investigations can be closed prematurely. Failure to recommend broader organisational improvements: PSC investigators identified a range of possible policy and procedural improvements in 27 per cent of files. However, no files formally recommended 'action on any identified deficiency in Victoria Police premises, equipment, policies, practices or procedures' as is recommended in the Victoria Police Manual. This is despite the fact that some of the recommendations made by PSC investigators identified opportunities for broader application of findings and improvements across the organisation. Details: Melbourne: The Commission, 2018. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 22, 2018 at: http://apo.org.au/system/files/179431/apo-nid179431-874266.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/system/files/179431/apo-nid179431-874266.pdf Shelf Number: 150637 Keywords: Citizen ComplaintsComplaints Against the PolicePolice AccountabilityPolice CorruptionPolice Misconduct |